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Introduction  
During Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government, there is a configuration of 
three combined and articulated fronts in Brazilian diplomacy, each one having their own 
characteristics. Thus, it is noted that Mercosur, South America and the Free Ttade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) represented the three regional fronts of activities of Brazilian 
diplomacy in the period, which were deepened and gained a new strategic direction in 
the 1990s, but keeping, in many aspects, the regional policy of the developmental 
matrix. Regional policy in the new emerging matrix gains centrality as an international 
insertion project of its own. In this sense, Mercosur represents the hard core of 
international projection of Brazil, first in Latin America and then worldwide. Thus, this 
article seeks to analyze the growing importance of regional environment to the Brazilian 
foreign policy in President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government. 
 
The concept of South America in Brazilian diplomacy 
Brazil’s foreign policy until the mid-twentieth century had a selective view of 
Latin America and South America. The concept of Latin America was considered too 
broad and vague and included an area under the control of the United States (Mexico 
and Central America) in which Brazil did not express great interest, still being under the 
influence of Rio Branco’s ideas about Americas’ division between the United States and 
Brazil. While the United States would be hegemonic in Central America, Brazil would 
have an ascendance over South America. In addition, according to Moniz Bandeira, it 
was the concept of South America that marked objectively the Brazilian diplomacy, 
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which had interests in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia until the mid-
twentieth century
1
.  
Thus, the geographical concept of South America served as a parameter for 
Brazil’s regional insertion, which avoided any involvement in the rest of the continent, 
while sought to protect the sub-region as its sphere of influence. However, in South 
America, the primary interest of the Brazilian foreign policy consisted of the countries 
of the River Plate Basin, while the relationship with countries of the Amazon Basin 
(after the negotiation of boundaries) was still considered of low priority. But, with the 
intensification of its industrial development, Brazil increasingly turned itself to the 
countries of that region, which was seen as a potential market for Brazilian 
manufactures. The integration of South America required the development of the 
Amazon, which until then separated the Brazilian industrial economy from the markets 
on the margins of the Pacific and the Caribbean. Besides, the development of the 
Amazon depended on the cooperation with the neighboring countries
2
. With the 
international changes of the 1980s, that directly hit Brazil’s international insertion’s 
matrix, the regional aspect gained considerable importance as one of the main 
articulator axis of the foreign insertion of the country
3
. 
Thus, the foreign policy of Fernando Henrique’s government to South America 
consisted of an effective application of a latent project of the Brazilian state diplomacy, 
now adapted to the conjuncture of globalization and integration
4
. In this way, by 
mobilizing ministries and enterprises through the attribution of strategic axis, Fernando 
Henrique’s government acted with relative coordination, which was getting sharper only 
with Mercosur’s crisis, as well as with the crisis of Brazil’s international insertion 
matrix, for the priority of the Brazilian foreign policy was initially the relationship with 
countries of the River Plate Basin. The redirection of the Brazilian energetic matrix and 
the great infrastructure projects also marked this period. 
                                                 
1 BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. O Brasil e a América do Sul. In: ALTEMANI, Henrique e LESSA, 
Antônio. (orgs) Relações Internacionais do Brasil: Temas e agendas. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2006, p. 269. 
2 Ibid., p. 273 
3 SENNES, Ricardo. As mudanças da política externa brasileira nos anos 80: uma potência média recém 
industrializada. Porto Alegre: Ed. da UFRGS, 2003., p. 125. 
4 Ibid., p. 278.  
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Mercosur: basis for Brazilian international insertion 
According to Amado Cervo, Mercosur’s integration process was the space of 
realist diplomacy of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Government. As Mercosur’s 
achievements, Amado Cervo ranks the empathy between Brazilian and Argentinean 
intelligence (with the multiplication of meetings and the demolition of prejudices); the 
creation of a peace zone at Southern Cone; the amplification of intrazone trade; 
Mercosur’s raising to the category of subject of international law through Ouro Preto 
Protocol; the production of a positive image; and the strengthening of the idea of South 
America. As for the skepticism on the evaluations of Mercosur, it sits on six 
weaknesses: different views of foreign affairs undermined the collective bargaining; the 
lack of joint coordination in macroeconomic policies and in negotiations in multilateral 
forums; the process was not built on the strengthening of national economic centers, but 
on trade; it did not created mechanisms to overcome the inequalities between the 
members; the incompatibility of exchange rate policies led to numerous disputes and 
mistrust; the lack of institutions created a very complex negotiating process, requiring to 
drive four autonomous decision-making processes at each decision
5
. Thus, in terms of 
gains and losses, Mercosur’s model of integration as an imperfect customs union 
favored the bloc and Brazil, which kept its decision-making autonomy and used the 
block as a bargaining tool in other areas. 
Mercosur’s central position in Brazil's international insertion project had been 
present since the beginning of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government and it was one 
of the great continuities of its foreign policy. Argentina's position in the Mercosur-
NAFTA relation was, in this period, relatively cohesive in relation to Brazil and 
Mercosur - evident in the discussion meetings on the FTAA -, being also noticeable, 
however, an approach to the United States. It is in this political framework that 
Argentine bargained with the United States and also with Brazil, aiming to achieve 
greater political prominence and better conditions to negotiate liberalization agreements, 
although Mercosur’s integrity was not put into play. Argentina saw its great opportunity 
                                                 
5 CERVO, Amado. Relações Internacionais do Brasil. Um balanço da era Cardoso. Revista Brasileira de 
Política Internacional. Número 45: 2002, p. 25-27. 
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of strategic insertion in Mercosur, just like all other member countries. The Argentinean 
government sought to increase its bargaining power and to prevent a back seat position 
in relation to Brazil in Mercosur, so that it could negotiate in better terms with 
Washington
6
. 
On the other hand, for small countries, the integration of the Americas seemed 
more attractive to economies such as Uruguay and Paraguay, with small industrial 
exporter sector
7
. These countries are more complementary than competitive in relation 
to industrial countries. Thus, Mercosur possibility to negotiate as a trading bloc 
depended on the ability of its members to deepen their understandings, creating a 
consensus on the FTAA. However, Chile’s and Bolivia’s associations, the negotiations 
with other South American countries, and the idea of deepening Mercosur through the 
construction of a common market marked its success and its international attractiveness. 
However, since 1997, with the international financial instability, the emerging 
economies weakened. In the wake of the crisis in early 1999 there was a capital flight 
from Brazil, to which the government responded with a sharp devaluation of Real, 
leading to increased costs of imports. Such fact hit hardly Argentina, which had a 
surplus with Brazil. Thus, the so-called Mercosur crisis began
8
. According to Paulo 
Vizentini, more than a crisis of integration, it was the erosion of an economic model, in 
an international environment different than that on the beginning of the decade. The 
global financial instability, the slow growth and the social crisis also provoked a crisis 
of internal legitimacy in the countries of the region, particularly in relation to the 
neoliberal policies
9
. 
The centrality of South America was becoming more evident with Mercosur’s 
crisis in 1999, which damaged Brazil’s international insertion logic during the first term 
                                                 
6 ALBUQUERQUE, José. A política externa do governo Fernando Henrique. IN: ALBUQUERQUE, 
José; SEITENFUS, Ricardo; CASTRO, Sergio.(orgs) Sessenta anos de política externa brasileira (1930-
1990). Rio de Janeiro: Editora Lúmen Júris, 2006, p. 504-505. 
7 VEIGA, Pedro da Motta. Mercosur and de Construction of the FTAA. Integration & Trade. INTAL, n. 
3, vol. 1 September-december 1997, p. 16. 
8 VIZENTINI, Paulo. A Alca e seu sentido estratégico: desafio ao Brasil e ao Mercosul.  Indicadores 
Econômicos FEE, v. 29, n. 3, p. 127-146, nov. 2001. p.  137-138. 
9 Ibid., p.138.  
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of Fernando Henrique Cardodo’s government, weakening both the negotiations and 
Brazil’s strategic positioning. The negotiations also revealed the centrality of the United 
States for lots of countries, in economic, commercial and strategic aspects
10
. 
 
 Integration at the subcontinent 
In the context of increasing integration in Latin America, the Brazilian 
government sought to expand and enhance the cooperation ties with the Amazonian 
countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela. 
Initiatives of transportation and energy integration received special attention, since they 
were considered essential to bring dynamism to those economies and to promote  
rapprochement between its societies. The growing cooperation between the 
communities living in border areas was also a priority and involved combined efforts 
between authorities at national and local levels in different countries, aiming at the 
implementation of bilateral development projects in such areas. A greater involvement 
of private sectors in the process of gradual rapprochement between Brazil and its 
Amazonian neighbors was also sought. 
The strengthening and integration of South America were part of the Brazilian 
strategy of negotiating with other integration processes, especially FTAA. Since the 
United States proposed the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas in 1991, the 
Brazilian government, as a counterpart, presented the idea (since Itamar’s government) 
of forming a Free Trade Area in South America (SAFTA), with the proposal of making 
free trade agreements with countries in South America. The receptivity of the South 
American countries showed the attraction that Brazil and Mercosur have on the region's 
economies. 
But it was necessary to combine two incomplete attempts of integration in South 
America. On the one hand, Mercosur, founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. On the other hand, the Andean Community of Nations, which gathers, 
since 1969, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela (which remained in the 
                                                 
10 VIGEVANI, Tullo e OLIVEIRA, Marcelo e CINTRA, Rodrigo. A política externa no Período FHC: a 
busca de autonomia pela integração. Revista Tempo Social – USP. Vol 15, n. 2, nov. 2003. p. 48.  
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bloc until 2006). The articulation of these two initiatives was the backbone of South 
America’s integration project. 
Mercosur member countries had accepted FTAA negotiations, which should 
include Mercosur, ALADI, the Andean Pact and Chile, but preserving the integrity of 
the existing blocs. In addition, in December 1995, Mercosur countries signed the 
Interregional Framework Agreement of Cooperation with the European Union. It was 
also sought a rapprochement with the Southern African countries. Along the same logic 
of expansion, a Framework Agreement for the creation of the Free Trade Area between 
Mercosur and the Andean Community (CAN) was signed in April 1998. Both blocs also 
committed to develop the physical structure of the region, with emphasis on export 
corridors. 
On August 31
st
 and September 1
st
 2000, at the first summit of South American 
presidents, the South American integration project was relaunched in Brasília, with the 
participation of the twelve South American presidents - the first time that all heads of 
state met on the continent. Two days before, in order to counterbalance Brazil’s lead 
role, Bill Clinton had visited Colombia and officialy supported 1.3 billion dollars to 
fight drug trafficking. The purpose of the South American meeting was to deepen 
existing cooperation, building a cooperation project in different fields: combating illicit 
drugs and related crimes; science and technology and physical integration. At the 
meeting, Cardoso already made reference to the projection of extra-continental 
integration initiative in South America.
11
 
The negotiations progressed at the meeting of foreign ministers in La Paz 
(Bolivia) in June 2001, with evidences of the construction of a free trade area before 
FTAA entering into force. The Second Meeting of the South American Presidents (held 
in Guayaquil, Ecuador, on July 26
th
 and 27
th
 2002) sought to deepen the idea of South 
American integration, even in a difficult conjecture, amidst the collapse of Argentina 
and the difficulties in most countries of the region. The meeting demonstrated the 
                                                 
11 CARDOSO, Fernando. Discurso no encerramento da Reunião de Presidentes da América do Sul. In: 
Palavra do Presidente. Vol 12, 2000, p. 198. 
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political will of the Brazilian government to advance the economic and political 
cooperation in South America
12
. 
The Amazon was also subject of regional coordination in order to ensure the 
sovereignty and prevent the harassment of international interests. In this context, the 
Amazonian Cooperation Treaty (TCA), signed in July 1978, is an important multilateral 
instrument to promote cooperation among the Amazonian countries - Brazil, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela -, in favor of the 
sustainable development of the region. Signed at a delicate moment for the Amazon 
region, the Treaty had the objective of reaffirming the sovereignty of the countries over 
the forest resources. In 1995, in order to institutionally strengthen the Treaty, the 
foreign ministers of the eight countries, meeting in Lima, decided to create a Permanent 
Secretariat for the TCA, to be held in Brasilia. The main objective of the TCA was to 
give the bloc a condition of international legal personality, allowing the future 
Secretariat to sign agreements with international institutions and to take part in 
multilateral forums, as well as to take international loans for the development of 
infrastructure and environmental preservation projects. 
Security and diplomatic resolution of conflicts  
During the 1990s, there was a change in the emphasis of traditional concerns 
about Brazilian territorial defense, going from the Platinum axis to the Andean region. 
The strain in the relations with Argentina, the increasing interdependence of Mercosur 
and the low perception of threats from the South Atlantic were some factors of this 
strategic shift, while the perception of threat in the Amazon region was widened, 
especially with the Colombian factor. Added to this, there was the fact that the United 
States had increased the drug trafficking combat in the region since 1992. Thus, forces 
of the Brazilian Army began to be transferred to the region and the Vigilance System of 
the Amazon was created. Facing the impossibility of "closing" the border to the FARC’s 
                                                 
12 VIZENTINI, Paulo. América do Sul, espaço geopolítico prioritário do projeto nacional brasileiro.In 
REBELO, Aldo; FERNANDES, Luis; CARDIM, Carlos. Política externa do Brasil para o século XXI. 
Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, Coordenação de Publicações, 2003, p. 206 
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incursions in the country territory, the Brazilian government began to fight FARC’s 
members that could enter its territory, through discrete engagements.
 13
  
Although the Brazilian government had concerns about the advance of the 
Colombian guerrillas on the national territory and about a possible direct intervention of 
the United States government in the region, it sought to support the Plan Colombia to 
fight drug trafficking in that country, with United States participation. However, in 
2001, Bush’s administration implemented the Andean Regional Initiative, which 
redirected funds not only for Colombia, but also to other Andean countries, besides 
Brazil and Panama. Thus, the American government sought to assist its allies 
(Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia), to persuade the countries in doubt (Peru), and to 
constrain the "opponents" of this policy (Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela).
 14 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government had a divergent diplomatic view on 
the issue of Colombia, rejecting a military participation in the conflict and not accepting 
the transfer of the territory of actions (of any armed actor) for Brazil. Moreover, he 
defended the international mediation of the conflict as well as refused to acknowledge 
FARC and other guerrilla groups as terrorists. This showed the concern of the Brazilian 
government about the American presence in the region
15
. 
In order to strengthen and maintain the security in the region, the Armed Forces 
decided to deploy the Vigilance System of the Amazon (Sivam - which consists of a 
series of radars) in 1993, resulting in a conceptual shift in the security doctrine of 
Amazon. The doctrine went from territorial occupation, with masses of population, to 
the control of the territory and airspace with high technology. Sivam project was 
considered innovative, because it used cooperation and international funding from the 
                                                 
13 COSTA, Thomaz. Em busca da relevância: os desafios do Brasil na segurança internacional do pós-
Guerra Fria. In: ALTEMANI, Henrique e LESSA, Antônio. (orgs) Relações Internacionais do Brasil: 
Temas e agendas. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2006, p. 293-294 
14 VILLA, Rafael e OSTROS, Maria. As Relações Colômbia, Países Vizinhos e Estados Unidos: visões 
em torno da agenda de segurança. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional. N. 48, vol. 2, 2005, p. 99-
106 
15 Ibid., p. 106-107.  
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area of security, and a combination of national intelligence with foreign technology as a 
multipurpose response to air traffic control in the region
16
. 
The defense of democracy would be present in the episodes of institutional 
crises in Paraguay in 1996, 1999 and 2001, a move that, soon after, led to the inclusion 
of the Democratic Clause in Mercosur, seeking to induce stability in the region. In 1996, 
Paraguayan general Lino Oviedo rose up against President Carlos Wasmosy. The crisis 
did not result in breakage of the legality due to the interference of the ambassadors of 
Mercosur countries, the United States and the OAS, which negotiated an agreement, by 
threats of boycott and political and economic isolation of the country
17
. The conflict in 
the 1998 elections in Paraguay, with Luis Carlos Argaña’s assassination, Raul Cubas’ 
(who had won) main rival, ended with Cubas’ resignation in March 1999 and his 
asylum in Brazil. The Brazilian president had advised the resignation. In May 2000, 
another military uprising was trying to overthrow President Luis Gonzalez Macchi, but 
it was stifled by the Navy and Air Force
18
. 
Along the same lines, other actions must be considered, such as the contribution 
to the solution of the border conflict between Peru and Ecuador, which occurred in 
January 1995. Taking the disputed border around the Cenepa River as a point of 
contention, the conflict had the Brazilian government as mediator. President Cardoso 
acted to obtain a cease-fire, leading the two countries, after sporadic fighting, to settle 
an agreement in Brasilia in 1998, under observation of the Guarantor Countries of the 
Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, 1942 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States). 
Brazil, besides articulating the agreement, also exerted the supervision of the region by 
the Brazilian Army in the Military Observers Ecuador-Peru Mission (MOMEP)
19
. 
Brazil also had a prominent role in supporting Fujimori’s government in Peru, in his 
second reelection in 2000. This policy generated some wearing internally and 
                                                 
16 COSTA, Thomaz. Em busca da relevância. Op. Cit, p. 294. 
17 BANDEIRA, Moniz. O Brasil e a América do Sul. Op. cit., p. 283 
18 Ibid., p. 284 
19 Ibid., p. 282.  
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internationally, as President Fujimori sought asylum in Japan after the final crisis of his 
administration, accused of corruption and authoritarianism
20
. 
Bolivia and Venezuela: extending the relationship 
During the 1990s, the major issue involving the relations between Brazil and 
Bolivia was the energy imports of this country, especially under the proposal of 
changing the Brazilian energy matrix, which required the use of natural gas to replace 
LPG and diesel
21. During Cardoso’s government, Brazil became the biggest buyer of 
Bolivian natural gas. In 1999, with the inauguration of the Santa Cruz-Sao Paulo 
pipeline, a new strategic partnership between Bolivia and Brazil was established. Brazil 
also gave importance to its relationship with Bolivia because of its dual role as a 
Platinum and Amazon country and as a commercial and strategic partner for the 
building of an energy hub in South America. 
In 2001, new agreements were signed on physical and energy integration, as the 
construction of the Santa Cruz-Puerto Suárez-Corumba highway and of a bridge 
between Brasileia and Cobija, as well as a common use airport in Cobija and 
Guayaramerin. In 2001, it was also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Technical Cooperation by the Foreign Ministers Celso Lafer, Brazil, and Javier Murillo, 
Bolivia, which sought to implement a program of scientific and technological 
cooperation through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). Thus, the energy issue 
guided the bilateral relations between the two countries, especially when the review and 
renegotiation of contracts for the supply of energy became an issue in the agenda, in the 
last years of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government22.  
In relation to Venezuela, Brazil struggled to get closer during the 1990s. After 
Menem, Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera was the colleague with whom Fernando 
Henrique most met. In addition to the physical and energy integration projects, bilateral 
contacts were deepened, especially after Hugo Chávez’s rise to the Venezuelan 
                                                 
20 SILVA, Carlos Eduardo. Política e Comércio Exterior. In: LAMOUNIER, Bolívar e FIGUEIREDO, 
Rubens. A Era FHC: Um balanço. São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados, 2002, p. 306 
21 VIZENTINI, Paulo. As relações internacionais da Bolívia: os desafios da globalização e da integração. 
In: ARAUJO, Heloísa (org). Os países da Comunidade Andina. Brasília: Funag/Ipri, 2004, p. 369.  
22 Ibid., p. 370.  
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government. The preoccupations in the United States with Chávez’s government turned 
Brazil into a kind of intermediary between the two governments
23
.  
President Hugo Chávez thickened the criticisms of the Brazilian government to 
the FTAA in Quebec City in 2002, and attended the Meeting of Mercosur Presidents, 
where he formalized the request for Venezuela joining the bloc. In the episode of the 
coup against Chávez, in April 11
th
 and 12
th
 2002, Brazil worked in coordination with 
OAS to pursue the condemnation of the coup. It was also President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso who collaborated in the defense of democracy in Venezuela during the crisis of 
late 2002, working, with the endorsement of elected President Luiz Inacio Lula da 
Silva, to provide oil to Venezuela through Petrobrás, once employees of PDVSA 
(Petróleos de Venezuela SA) maintained for many weeks a general strike against 
Chávez’s government24. 
 
Conclusions  
The concept and foreign policy for South America was gaining a strategic space 
at the end of Cardoso’s government, and has been deepened in Lula’s government. This 
is perhaps one of the traits of most striking continuity between the two governments, 
which gives a long-term state policy to the Brazilian and South American projects. 
It occurs that Mercosur was, in fact, a balance and a space of more realistic 
conception to the insertion of Brazil in the international system - in the context of a 
neoliberal diplomacy. For the Brazilian foreign policy, Mercosur was able to articulate a 
regional space and thereby succeeded in calling the interest of other economic blocs, 
setting itself as a respected speaker both in multilateral forum and bilateral agreements. 
Such a position, besides the growth prospects, was opening up possibilities of 
cooperation with all kinds of countries and regional blocs, and the establishment of 
strategic partnerships. Hence, for the Brazilian foreign policy, Mercosur was an 
important foothold in the FTAA negotiations and a pole of attraction of other countries 
in South America. 
                                                 
23 SILVA, Carlos Eduardo. Política e comércio Exterior. Op. cit., p. 319. 
24 BANDEIRA, Moniz. O Brasil e a América do Sul. Op., cit., p. 287 
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South America represented the next step in the Brazilian strategy. Paradoxically, 
an integration project for the subcontinent was launched with intensity exactly in a 
period of crisis in Mercosur and of strengthened negotiations about FTAA. In this sense, 
the Brazilian government signaled that it had a proposal for a more horizontal 
integration, which would strengthen all the countries participating in any negotiating 
process. The outcome of the summit with the South American presidents, in 2000, 
indicates this. 
The centrality of South America in the Brazilian diplomatic interests also sits on 
the security dimension, where the Amazon region is considered of primary interest. 
However, new political processes, including the crisis of the neoliberal model in the 
Andean region (especially with the rise of Hugo Chávez’s government in Venezuela), 
have given a new dynamism in terms of integration. 
Thus, the main topics/axes in the relations with South America during Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso’s government were the issue of energy (petroleum, natural gas and 
hydropower), integration (FTAA, strengthening and expanding the relationship with 
Mercosur and Andean Community), security (drug trafficking, strengthening of 
surveillance systems in Amazon, and issues related to the border) and the political 
processes in the region (particularly, the strengthening of democracy). The relationship 
of these axes took place through the large project of physical integration between South 
American countries, which has been implemented and further developed in Lula’s 
government. 
 
Translated by Ana Julia Possamai, revised by Felipe Brum Cunha. 
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RESUMO 
Esse artigo tem como objetivo analisar a crescente importância do entorno 
regional para a política externa brasileira no governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso. A 
hipótese central é que o conceito e a política externa para a América do Sul foi 
ganhando espaço estratégico ao final do governo Cardoso, através do Mercosul e do 
projeto de integração sul-americana. 
 
ABSTRACT  
This article seeks to analyze the growing importance of regional environment to 
the Brazilian foreign policy in President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government. The 
central hypothesis is that the concept and foreign policy for South America was gaining 
a strategic space at the end of Cardoso’s government, through Mercosur and the project 
of South American integration. 
 
